ai-fuzzing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the Bash tool to execute fuzzing engines, instrument code, and process crash data. This behavior is fundamental to the skill's purpose of automating vulnerability discovery.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install various security tools and grammars from external repositories (e.g., AFL++, Nautilus, Gramatron, and Syzkaller). While these involve remote code sources, they are standard tools in the security research domain, and one source (Syzkaller) originates from a trusted organization.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The guides describe workflows that involve compiling source code at runtime (e.g., using afl-clang-fast) to create instrumented binaries for testing. This is a common requirement for coverage-guided fuzzing.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data generated during fuzzing sessions or network monitoring while maintaining powerful tool access.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through fuzzer crash artifacts (findings/default/crashes/), network traffic captures (.pcap files), and external API responses from tools like wfuzz or schemathesis.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions that warn the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within crash reports or protocol data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash (command execution), Write and Edit (file system modification), and WebFetch (network operations).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation logic defined for the external data before it is analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 04:36 PM