deception-honeypot

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents a piped remote script execution pattern in guides/canary-deployment-playbook.md (§5.3) for HFish sensor installation using curl -s https://hfish.example.com/api/sensor/install | bash. While provided as a template for a known security tool, this pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from a remote source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of sensitive system commands for configuration, including iptables for network redirection, systemctl for service management, and auditctl for file integrity monitoring. These are necessary for honeypot operation but provide broad control over the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions to read and write to sensitive file paths, including ~/.aws/credentials, /etc/shadow, and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. While intended for planting decoy honeytokens as part of the deception strategy, these operations involve direct manipulation of critical security artifacts.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Frequent use of sudo is required for deployment and tool installation. Additionally, the HFish enterprise deployment instructions in test-cases.md (TC-DH-003) and payloads.md (§3.1) specify the use of the --privileged flag for Docker containers, which significantly reduces container isolation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves the ingestion and analysis of untrusted data captured from attackers (honeypot session logs) across multiple files (e.g., SKILL.md Exercise 9, payloads.md §12).
  • Ingestion points: Log parsing of cowrie.json, conpot.json, and opencanary.log containing attacker-supplied usernames, passwords, and command inputs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in the provided jq and python parsing scripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (curl, misp-submit.py), file manipulation, and system configuration.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of attacker-controlled strings is documented before the data is processed or forwarded to threat intelligence platforms.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 04:36 PM