multi-agent-collaboration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on a central coordinator agent that aggregates structured JSON findings from multiple specialized worker agents. This ingestion process creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in vulnerability descriptions or evidence fields.
  • Ingestion points: The coordinator ingests data through the result aggregation process and finding handoff messages defined in 'payloads.md' and 'SKILL.md'.
  • Boundary markers: The aggregation templates do not currently employ explicit LLM-level delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data fields extracted from worker agents.
  • Capability inventory: The coordinator agent is granted significant capabilities, including the 'Bash', 'Agent', and 'WebFetch' tools, which could be exploited if an injected instruction is interpreted as a command.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation logic is documented for the 'description' or 'evidence' fields of ingested findings before they are processed by the coordinator for reporting or further action.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and 'payloads.md' file provide numerous templates for executing common security utilities via the 'Bash' tool. These include network scanners like 'nmap' and 'masscan', web assessment tools such as 'sqlmap' and 'ffuf', and OSINT tools like 'theHarvester'. These executions are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of penetration testing orchestration and are correctly scoped within the 'ALLOWED OPERATIONS' section of the agent mandates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 04:36 PM