pam-privilege-attack
Skill: Privileged Access Management (PAM) Privilege Attack
Supplementary Files:
payloads.md-- Per-vendor payload catalogs for CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea, One Identity, ManageEngine PMP, WALLIX, Devolutions, Xton Core; plus cross-cutting patterns (cred file theft, session hijack, API key abuse, JIT workflow bypass, PAM-aware pass-the-hash) (70+ code blocks, 2,200+ lines)test-cases.md-- Structured test case templates (15 cases TC-PM-001 through TC-PM-015 covering presence recon, vendor-specific abuse, and cross-cutting patterns)guides/pam-privilege-attack-playbook.md-- End-to-end playbook: PAM recon, vendor identification, exploitation, credential extraction, lateral movement to actual privileged targets, JIT persistence, lab setup, and detection guidance
Summary
PAM Privilege Attack skill domain covering vendor-specific compromise of Privileged Access Management platforms. PAM systems (CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea, One Identity, ManageEngine, WALLIX, Devolutions, Xton) sit at the very top of the enterprise trust stack — they hold the credentials for root, Domain Admin, cloud root, database SA, and network device enable accounts. Compromising the PAM is equivalent to compromising every privileged asset the PAM manages. Recent ransomware operators (BlackCat/ALPHV, LockBit, Royal/BlackSuit) explicitly target PAM infrastructure as the first step in their affiliate playbooks because once the PAM falls, downstream extortion leverage is total.
Domain: privileged-access-management
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552-Unsecured Credentials, T1552.001-Credentials In Files, T1552.004-Private Keys, T1550-Use Alternate Authentication Material, T1550.002-Pass the Hash, T1550.004-Web Session Cookie, T1098-Account Manipulation
Differentiation from Adjacent Skills
This skill is deliberately scoped to vendor-specific PAM platforms. It does not duplicate general secret-management coverage.