pqc-implementation-attack
Skill: PQC Implementation Attack
Supplementary Files:
payloads.md— fingerprinting probes, side-channel and fault-injection lab workflows, RNG flaw checks, Kyber ransomware triage commandstest-cases.md— 5 structured test cases (library fingerprint, remote timing, hybrid downgrade, ransomware triage, SCA lab)guides/kyber-ransomware-retrospective.md— Kyber ransomware event retrospective + PQC implementation attack surface survey
Summary
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) implementation-layer attack domain. FIPS 203 (ML-KEM/Kyber), ML-DSA, and their library implementations (liboqs, oqs-provider, PQClean, pqm4, vendor TLS stacks) carry a new class of exploitable implementation defects: variable-time arithmetic (KyberSlash-class division leaks), single-trace-friendly lattice decoding, fault-sensitive implicit rejection, and entropy failures in keygen. This skill covers the full attack chain — library fingerprinting, side-channel and fault-injection exploitation under authorized lab conditions, RNG/keygen flaw analysis, hybrid KEM combiner implementation defects — plus the operational side: Kyber ransomware sample triage and implementation-defect-based recovery assessment.
Domain: crypto | Standard: FIPS 203 / ML-KEM (Kyber) | Layer: implementation (not protocol design)
Description
NIST finalized FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber) in August 2024, and hybrid deployments (X25519MLKEM768) became default in major browsers and CDNs through 2025-2026. The protocol mathematics is considered strong — but implementations are young. The 2024 KyberSlash disclosures showed that division-based Barrett reduction in widely-deployed Kyber code produced remotely-observable timing differences, letting an attacker recover secrets from a vulnerable server. This is the pattern this skill systematizes: the math is post-quantum, the code is not.
The 2026-03 CSA advisory on Kyber-based ransomware (see guides/kyber-ransomware-retrospective.md) confirmed a second operational reality: adversaries now use ML-KEM in payloads to wrap session keys, defeating classical key-recovery shortcuts that worked against RSA/ECIES-based ransomware. Recovery now depends on finding implementation defects — key reuse, deterministic nonces, flawed RNG — rather than factoring.