storage-san-attack

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest and process data from untrusted external sources, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is directed to use tools like nmap, curl, snmpwalk, and aws s3 ls to gather information from remote storage appliances and cloud buckets.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing this external output.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, allowing it to execute shell commands based on its analysis of the ingested data.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the data retrieved from external systems before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and guides suggest downloading several security tools and utilities from external sources.
  • Evidence: The guides mention downloading minio and mc from dl.min.io, aws-vault from its GitHub release page, and various pentest tools like lazys3, S3Scanner, and slurp from GitHub repositories (e.g., github.com/sa7mon/S3Scanner). These references are documented neutrally as part of the lab setup and tool inventory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples of shell commands for the agent to use when interacting with storage systems.
  • Evidence: The payloads.md and test-cases.md files contain a wide array of commands for iSCSI login, NFS mounting, SMB relay, and S3 bucket manipulation. These include commands like iscsiadm, mount, crackmapexec, and aws s3api. These are legitimate tools for the intended purpose of the skill.
Recommendations
  • Contains 2 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 04:36 PM