bruhs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the way it handles external data at runtime.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data in
commands/cook.md(via Linear ticket descriptions fetched via MCP) andcommands/peep.md(via PR review comments fetched via the GitHub CLI). - Boundary markers: The prompts defined in
commands/peep.mdand the workflows incommands/cook.mddo not utilize explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags) or instructions for the agent to ignore any embedded AI instructions within the fetched text. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including arbitrary command execution (
Bash), file modification (Edit), and interaction with authenticated CLI tools (gh) and MCP servers (Linear). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization performed on the external content before it is processed by subagents.
Audit Metadata