computer-use
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the AI agent to "re-run it with escalated permissions" if a
runtime_access_deniederror occurs. This encourages the agent to bypass security constraints or request administrative/sudo access during runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to function, specifically resolving paths via environment variables (
ORCA_CLI_COMMAND,ORCA_DEV_REPO_ROOT) and running local executables likeorca,orca-ide, ororca-devto fetch further instructions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a dynamic loader for external instructions fetched via
ORCA skills get computer-use. This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection: - Ingestion points: The output of the
ORCA skills getcommand inSKILL.mdis loaded directly into the agent's session. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or warnings provided to the agent to treat the fetched content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill description grants the agent significant capabilities, including GUI control (clicks, typing, screenshots) and programmatic access via shell, filesystem, and HTTP tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the dynamically fetched content is performed before the agent acts upon it.
Audit Metadata