academic-pipeline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to invoke the tectonic and pandoc command-line utilities to compile LaTeX source files into PDF documents during the final stages of the pipeline. This is a legitimate functional requirement for the skill's stated goal of manuscript preparation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted content from user-provided paper drafts and reviewer feedback.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context in agents/pipeline_orchestrator_agent.md and agents/integrity_verification_agent.md during the drafting, integrity verification, and revision phases.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to mitigate the risk of the agent obeying malicious commands embedded within the processed papers.
  • Capability inventory: The skill maintains access to capabilities such as WebSearch and shell command execution for document compilation.
  • Sanitization: There are no documented procedures for sanitizing or escaping the content of external documents before they are interpolated into agent prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 03:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — academic-pipeline