briefing-note
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local scripts located in
~/.claude/skills/econstack/bin/silently in the background for version checking and project state management. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The preamble includes the command
eval "$(~/.claude/skills/econstack/bin/econstack-slug)". This evaluates the output of a local binary as shell code, which is a dynamic execution pattern that could lead to unauthorized command execution if the output is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from web searches and external R packages (ONS, FRED, Comtrade) to generate briefing notes. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious data could attempt to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
WebSearchandWebFetchtools, and external R package data specified in Step 3 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard potential embedded instructions within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools throughout its execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the external content before it is incorporated into the output files.
Audit Metadata