babysit-pr
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into multiple shell commands (e.g.,gh pr view $ARGUMENTS,gh pr checks $ARGUMENTS, andgh api ... pulls/$ARGUMENTS/comments) without any shell quoting or validation. This allows a user to execute arbitrary commands by appending shell metacharacters to the PR number. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to automatically ingest and "fix" issues based on feedback found in Pull Request comments. Since these comments come from untrusted sources (humans or bots), a malicious actor could post crafted comments containing instructions to trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions.
- Ingestion points: GitHub API comments endpoint in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to consider all top-level comments without a reply as unaddressed feedback.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the local filesystem, perform
git commitandgit push, execute administrative merges, and run arbitrary repository scripts viapnpm run prep. - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering is applied to the content of the comments before the agent attempts to implement the requested "fixes".
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs the
--adminflag when executinggh pr merge. This allows the agent to merge code while bypassing repository branch protection rules, such as required status checks or minimum approval counts. When combined with the potential for indirect prompt injection, this significantly increases the risk of unverified or malicious code being integrated into the main branch.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata