harness-agents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation describes an API (
resolveAgentHarness) used to spawn external agent binaries as local child processes communicating via stdio JSON-RPC. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Details a
run-codetool that executes code modules through a pluggableSandboxAdapter, with the default implementation using a local Node.js child process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Provides instructions to install and run optional dependencies from well-known technology organizations, including
@google/gemini-cliand@zed-industries/agent-client-protocol. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Specifies that spawned child processes inherit the host's environment variables, which is a standard feature allowing agents to reuse existing local CLI login sessions for authentication.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user prompts through agents with file system and command execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system via the
promptfield in thestartAgentHarnessRunfunction (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify explicit boundary markers or delimiters for the prompt input.
- Capability inventory: The system enables child process spawning, arbitrary code execution via sandboxes, and local file system access (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: Includes workspace path validation to prevent file system traversal and uses isolation through
SandboxAdapterfor code execution.
Audit Metadata