mobile-testing

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation of the Maestro CLI through the command curl -Ls "https://get.maestro.mobile.dev" | bash. This pattern executes remote code directly in the shell without any verification or hash-checking.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to expand its own permissions by modifying builder.config.json. The requested configuration uses wildcards for powerful system commands (e.g., curl *, chmod *, rm *, kill *), which significantly broadens the agent's attack surface and allows for arbitrary system interaction.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes installation scripts from the external domain mobile.dev during the environment setup phase.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from the local repository.
  • Ingestion points: Reads and processes YAML flow files in the maestro/ directory and application code in ios-app/ and android-app/.
  • Boundary markers: None; there are no instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the test flows or source code.
  • Capability inventory: Extremely high; the requested ACL expansion provides the agent with network access, file system manipulation, and process control.
  • Sanitization: None; the skill does not perform any validation of the content read from the project files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.maestro.mobile.dev - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 04:10 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mobile-testing