mobile-testing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation of the Maestro CLI through the command
curl -Ls "https://get.maestro.mobile.dev" | bash. This pattern executes remote code directly in the shell without any verification or hash-checking. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to expand its own permissions by modifying
builder.config.json. The requested configuration uses wildcards for powerful system commands (e.g.,curl *,chmod *,rm *,kill *), which significantly broadens the agent's attack surface and allows for arbitrary system interaction. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes installation scripts from the external domain
mobile.devduring the environment setup phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from the local repository.
- Ingestion points: Reads and processes YAML flow files in the
maestro/directory and application code inios-app/andandroid-app/. - Boundary markers: None; there are no instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the test flows or source code.
- Capability inventory: Extremely high; the requested ACL expansion provides the agent with network access, file system manipulation, and process control.
- Sanitization: None; the skill does not perform any validation of the content read from the project files.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.maestro.mobile.dev - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata