seeding-playbooks

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands by interpolating variables derived from external data without sufficient sanitization.
  • The variable $org is interpolated directly into the command releases admin org get "$org" within a bash loop in Step 2 of the documentation.
  • The variable {slug} is interpolated into sub-agent prompt templates and fallback commands in Steps 4 and 5 (e.g., releases admin playbook {slug} --notes-file -). If these values (slugs or org names) are derived from untrusted sources and contain shell metacharacters, it could result in arbitrary code execution in the local environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection due to the way it handles external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill retrieves and processes organization metadata, source details, and release logs through the releases CLI in both the Compilation and Verified workflows.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates for sub-agents (Step 4) do not include clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The agents and sub-agents have the ability to execute shell commands and modify production data (playbooks) using the releases CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization, validation, or escaping before the retrieved content is interpolated into agent prompts or executed in shell scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 17, 2026, 11:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — seeding-playbooks