uploads-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables an agent to process untrusted data from various external sources, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted content can enter the agent's context through uploads screenshot (rendering web URLs or local HTML), uploads ingest (scanning GitHub pull request and issue comments), and uploads put --url (fetching remote assets). Boundary markers (absent): The documentation does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content. Capability inventory: The uploads tool can perform network egress, filesystem writes, and browser-based rendering. Sanitization (absent): While screenshots are rendered in a browser, the agent may still be influenced by visual or textual information extracted from the captures.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents the use of uploads put --url, which permits the retrieval of content from arbitrary HTTPS endpoints. This is a functional requirement for the tool but constitutes a network ingestion point. Connections to uploads.sh and its subdomains are directed to the vendor's infrastructure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed instructions for driving the uploads CLI, which involves the execution of shell commands that interact with the local environment, including file management and network communication.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The uploads screenshot tool includes --eval and --init-script flags, allowing the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context during capture. This mechanism enables dynamic code execution on the target page.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 10, 2026, 08:17 PM