uploads-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables an agent to process untrusted data from various external sources, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted content can enter the agent's context through
uploads screenshot(rendering web URLs or local HTML),uploads ingest(scanning GitHub pull request and issue comments), anduploads put --url(fetching remote assets). Boundary markers (absent): The documentation does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content. Capability inventory: Theuploadstool can perform network egress, filesystem writes, and browser-based rendering. Sanitization (absent): While screenshots are rendered in a browser, the agent may still be influenced by visual or textual information extracted from the captures. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents the use of
uploads put --url, which permits the retrieval of content from arbitrary HTTPS endpoints. This is a functional requirement for the tool but constitutes a network ingestion point. Connections touploads.shand its subdomains are directed to the vendor's infrastructure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed instructions for driving the
uploadsCLI, which involves the execution of shell commands that interact with the local environment, including file management and network communication. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
uploads screenshottool includes--evaland--init-scriptflags, allowing the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context during capture. This mechanism enables dynamic code execution on the target page.
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