technical-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses platform-specific
!syntax inSKILL.mdto load internal protocols and project configurations into the agent's context during initialization. - Evidence: Commands such as
!cat skills/_shared/protocols/ux-protocol.mdand!cat .production-grade.yamlare executed at skill load. - [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Phase 4 of the skill workflow recommends installing standard NPM packages from the official registry to build a documentation site.
- Evidence: The skill lists
@docusaurus/core,@docusaurus/preset-classic,@docusaurus/theme-search-algolia, and other well-known dependencies in the generatedpackage.json. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the repository (git logs and source code comments) to generate user-facing text, creating a surface for potential instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: Commit history logs processed in
phases/05-changelog.mdand code comments analyzed inphases/01-content-audit.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate the ingested data from the agent's control logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to read from the codebase and write to the local filesystem (
docs/,CHANGELOG.md). - Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of the input text is mentioned in the documentation generation phases.
Audit Metadata