busa-wechat-crm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local WeChat message history and contact details, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: untrusted data enters the context through
scripts/wechat-safe.mjsandcontent/busa-wechat-crm-app/wechat-status.mjswhich query message history, contact names, and remarks. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON formatting for all ingested data and provides explicit instructions in
SKILL.mdto use safe wrappers rather than piping raw output. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
execFileto run local binaries and uses thebusabase-sdkto write data to an external CRM folder. - Sanitization: The skill employs a specialized library (
scripts/lib/sensitive-content.mjs) that uses regular expressions to detect and redact sensitive secrets, including OpenAI keys, AWS keys, and Bearer tokens, before they are returned to the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
wechat-cli-rscommand-line utility to interact with local data. - Execution is managed through
execFileandexecFileSync, which are safer than shell-spawning methods likeexec. - Commands are strictly limited to an allowlist of read-only operations:
contacts,sessions,history,search,stats, andunread. - The skill explicitly forbids automatic initialization (
wechat-cli-rs init), requiring the user to run the command manually in their terminal.
Audit Metadata