typst-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute
typst --versionin the local workspace to resolve the target compiler version. Additionally, thescripts/validate_version_support.pyvalidation script usessubprocess.runto invoke local Typst binaries for automated testing of compatibility fixtures. These actions are consistent with the skill's primary function as a documentation and compilation aid. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted content from user-provided Typst source files and structured data (JSON, YAML, TOML, etc.).
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md identifies user-provided templates, imports, and assets as inputs.
- Boundary markers: None are specified in the instructions to separate user content from agent logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of executing shell commands (
typst --version) and writing files (.typsource). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of external content is mentioned. While these factors represent a vulnerability surface, they are inherent to the skill's purpose, and no active exploitation or malicious patterns were detected.
Audit Metadata