bitrix-background-jobs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation for Bitrix Agents (
CAgent) inrules/agents.mdexplicitly notes that thenamefield of an agent is PHP code executed usingeval(). This is a core mechanism of the Bitrix framework for scheduling tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: A vulnerability surface exists in
rules/agents.mdwhere user-supplied or runtime variables (like$offset) are interpolated into the string that will eventually beeval()'d. The skill correctly identifies this risk and advises developers to "cast/escape them" to prevent arbitrary code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of the Bitrix CLI tool in
rules/messenger-config.mdfor consuming message queues (e.g.,php bitrix/bitrix.php messenger:consume). This is standard operational procedure for the Bitrix Messenger system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The Messenger system described in
rules/messenger.mdandrules/messenger-config.mdprocesses data serialized as JSON. While this is structured data, the skill notes that messages are rebuilt via constructor parameters, which is a potential surface for injection if message contents are not properly validated by the receiver'sprocess()method. - Ingestion points: Variables interpolated into
CAgentstrings (rules/agents.md); Public properties ofAbstractMessageclasses (rules/messenger.md). - Boundary markers: None for agent name strings; JSON structure for Messenger messages.
- Capability inventory: PHP
eval()execution viaCAgent; Callable execution viaApplication::addBackgroundJob(rules/background-job.md). - Sanitization: Documentation includes explicit instructions to cast or escape arguments in agent names.
Audit Metadata