byted-bytehouse-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the
uvxtool to fetch and install the ByteHouse MCP server package from the vendor's official GitHub repository atgithub.com/volcengine/mcp-server. This is documented as the standard installation path for the service.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime execution of the downloaded MCP server implementation is facilitated byuvxand themcpPython library to enable database interaction capabilities. This behavior is consistent with the skill's primary intended purpose.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided shell scripts (start_mcp_service.sh,stop_mcp_service.sh,restart_mcp_service.sh) execute system-level commands, includingkill,ps, andmkdir, to manage the background lifecycle of the MCP server process.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection through its database interaction tools. \n - Ingestion points: The
queryinput of therun_select_queryandrun_dml_ddl_querytools, as well as the text content retrieved from the database and processed by scripts liketest_mcp_server.py. \n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructional constraints provided to the agent to differentiate between trusted system instructions and potentially malicious data embedded within database query results. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (via service management scripts), perform network operations to remote database hosts, and execute arbitrary SQL commands (including DDL/DML). \n
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill code does not implement sanitization, parameterization, or validation for SQL queries before execution, nor does it sanitize data retrieved from the database before passing it back to the agent context.
Audit Metadata