spec-forge-intake

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md frequently invoke a CLI tool named spec-forge-cli using parameters gathered directly from the user. For instance, the init and resolve commands use variables like <target-dir>, <spec-id>, <request-title>, and <request-summary>. If the underlying platform does not provide strict validation for these fields (which are defined as strings and paths in agents/ux.yaml), an attacker could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill demonstrates a dependency on an external executable, spec-forge-cli. While this tool appears to be part of the ByteLandTechnology ecosystem, its source, versioning, and integrity are not defined within the skill package, representing a dependency on external code that must be pre-present in the execution environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface by collecting open-ended text from the user and storing it in framing artifacts.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided fields such as problem_statement, problem_goal, and request_summary in agents/ux.yaml.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when writing these values to request-context.yaml.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file writes and merges using the spec-forge-cli tool across all workflow steps.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not describe any validation or escaping of the user-provided text before it is persisted into the YAML artifacts, which may be processed by other automated agents in subsequent architectural stages.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 28, 2026, 09:29 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — spec-forge-intake