spec-forge-intake
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdfrequently invoke a CLI tool namedspec-forge-cliusing parameters gathered directly from the user. For instance, theinitandresolvecommands use variables like<target-dir>,<spec-id>,<request-title>, and<request-summary>. If the underlying platform does not provide strict validation for these fields (which are defined as strings and paths inagents/ux.yaml), an attacker could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill demonstrates a dependency on an external executable,
spec-forge-cli. While this tool appears to be part of theByteLandTechnologyecosystem, its source, versioning, and integrity are not defined within the skill package, representing a dependency on external code that must be pre-present in the execution environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface by collecting open-ended text from the user and storing it in framing artifacts.
- Ingestion points: User-provided fields such as
problem_statement,problem_goal, andrequest_summaryinagents/ux.yaml. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when writing these values to
request-context.yaml. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file writes and merges using the
spec-forge-clitool across all workflow steps. - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any validation or escaping of the user-provided text before it is persisted into the YAML artifacts, which may be processed by other automated agents in subsequent architectural stages.
Audit Metadata