skills/c0nant/c-skills/review-mr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

review-mr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from third-party merge request metadata and code diffs.\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted third-party data using glab mr view, gh pr view, git diff, and git log commands as specified in SKILL.md (Steps 1 and 2).\n
  • Boundary markers: It implements strict boundary markers, including multi-layer fenced blocks and specific instructions for both the main agent and sub-agent to treat the content as data and ignore embedded instructions (Step 7).\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (git, glab, gh), write review files to a local scratch directory, and post comments to merge request platforms upon user approval (Steps 1, 9, and 10).\n
  • Sanitization: It includes logic to handle branch names securely by single-quoting inputs and converting them to commit SHAs to prevent shell command injection (Step 1).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates shell commands using branch names, which are considered untrusted third-party input.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Step 1) demonstrates the construction of shell commands such as git fetch origin '<source-branch>'.\n
  • Context: The risk is mitigated by the skill's defensive programming, which includes wrapping inputs in single quotes and resolving them to static SHAs before use in most commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 10:57 PM