to-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill generates specifications based on the current conversation context, which is untrusted input. It lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to disregard potential malicious commands embedded within that context.
- Ingestion points: Current conversation context and codebase understanding used to produce specifications (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No specific markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to wrap the conversation data in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
ghandglabtools and local file writes to the.scratch/directory (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the data extracted from the conversation before it is used to build the specification or interpolated into shell commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external CLI tools (
ghandglab) to publish created issues. It interpolates generated text directly into command-line arguments such as--title,--body, and--description. This presents a surface for command injection if the agent's shell execution environment does not adequately handle character escaping for the interpolated content from the specification.
Audit Metadata