delegate-tickets
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the local system by executing several Git commands to manage the repository state during orchestration.
- Evidence: It runs
git status --short,git add -A(after user confirmation and after each ticket), and instructs subagents to rungit add -N .to track new files without staging them. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external ticket files and passes their contents to subagents as primary implementation instructions, creating a vulnerability surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Ticket files (Markdown or text) stored in a specified directory or provided as a list.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or instruction-isolation markers when passing the ticket path/content to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the ability to execute shell commands (
git), and the subagents it creates are explicitly described as having "full tool access." - Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or validate the contents of the ticket files before they are utilized by the subagents.
Audit Metadata