review-axes
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture allows for the processing of untrusted data which is subsequently fed into the execution context of sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from
git log(commit messages),git diff(code changes), and the contents of external specification files located in directories like.scratch/,docs/, orspecs/. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used when passing these external inputs into the sub-agent prompts defined in the "Spawn both sub-agents in parallel" step.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (via git) and perform file system writes to update local markdown files.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not prescribe any escaping, validation, or filtering of the external content before it is interpolated into the prompts for the
AgentorTasktools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute multiple
gitcommands (git diff,git log,git rev-parse) using a "fixed point" provided by the user. If the agent's execution environment does not properly sanitize this input, it could lead to command injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions define a process where prompts for sub-agents are dynamically constructed via string concatenation of command outputs and file contents. This generated prompt content is then executed using the platform's sub-agent invocation tools (
Agentin Claude Code orTaskin Cursor). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to fetch data from remote issue trackers such as GitHub and GitLab to identify the technical specifications for the code review, depending on the repository configuration.
Audit Metadata