to-issues
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run
/setup-matt-pocock-skillsto configure conventions and triage vocabularies. This is a non-standard command invocation that executes logic outside the skill's own code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell-based CLI tools (
ghfor GitHub andglabfor GitLab) to create issues. It uses heredoc patterns to pass issue bodies, which may be vulnerable to command injection if the source material (plans/PRDs) contains shell-breaking characters that are not properly escaped by the platform's tool-calling implementation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted external data (plans, specs, or PRDs) to generate instructions for 'AFK agents'.
- Ingestion points: Reads plan, spec, or PRD content provided in the conversation context or fetched from external issue trackers (Step 2).
- Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
gh,glab) and write files to the local file system (.scratch/). - Sanitization: There is no programmatic sanitization or escaping of the content. While Step 5 includes a user review 'quiz', this manual checkpoint relies on the user spotting malicious instructions or formatting that could lead to command injection or downstream agent manipulation.
Audit Metadata