competitive-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to retrieve and interpret data from arbitrary external web sources, including competitor landing pages, review platforms, and social media. This ingestion of untrusted external data creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in those external sources could attempt to hijack the agent's logic or bias its output.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is fetched from the web using the
WebFetchtool during the product and business research phases (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions to isolate the external content from the agent's primary task instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill's
allowed-toolsare limited toWebSearch,WebFetch, andRead. While the instructions mention saving output to an research folder, the omission of aWritetool in the frontmatter restricts the agent's ability to directly modify the local filesystem, thereby mitigating the impact of potential payload delivery. The primary risk remains output poisoning that could influence subsequent human or agent decision-making. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for the validation, filtering, or sanitization of the content fetched from external sources.
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