agentic-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes MCP servers as subprocesses to facilitate tool calling. In
src/client.ts, thecreateTransportmethod implements thestdiotransport type by spawning a process using thecommand,args, andenvparameters provided in themcp-servers.jsonconfiguration file. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution to manage its background processes. The
cli/utils/daemon.tsandcli/commands/daemon.tsfiles utilizechild_process.spawnto launch the MCP daemon as a detached process, ensuring it remains active across agent sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by design, as it enables the agent to process data from external MCP servers (such as browser-based or file-system-based servers) and act upon that data.
- Ingestion points: Data from external MCP tools is returned to the agent context via
src/client.tsand thecallcommand incli/commands/call.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddo not provide specific delimiters or warnings to help the agent distinguish between its core instructions and data retrieved from tools. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to spawn subprocesses (
spawninsrc/client.tsandcli/utils/daemon.ts) and perform network operations viaaxiosand standard MCP transports insrc/client.ts. - Sanitization: There is no specific sanitization logic applied to the tool output before it is returned to the agent, relying on the agent's internal safety filters.
Audit Metadata