codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill functions by executing the
codexCLI with user-supplied prompts and configuration flags. - Instructions mandate appending
2>/dev/nullto all execution commands. This suppresses the standard error stream, potentially concealing security warnings, tool errors, or diagnostic messages from both the agent and the user. - The recommended shell piping pattern for resuming sessions (
echo "prompt" | codex exec ...) represents a potential command injection surface if the agent fails to properly escape user-supplied content before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to ingest and analyze repository content, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Files within the local repository are read and analyzed by the
codex execcommand as described inSKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform filesystem writes (
--sandbox workspace-write) and request broad system access (--sandbox danger-full-access). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to treat ingested codebase content as untrusted data.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is provided for the data read from the repository.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains deceptive claims regarding its capabilities and underlying technology.
- It references non-existent models such as "GPT-5.2" and "GPT-5.2-max" and provides unverifiable performance metrics (e.g., "76.3% SWE-bench") which may mislead users about the skill's actual safety and effectiveness.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The README provides installation instructions that involve downloading code from an external source.
- The installation workflow fetches the skill source from the
skills-directoryGitHub organization. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill facilitates the use of high-impact execution modes.
- It documents the use of flags like
--sandbox danger-full-accessand--full-auto, which significantly increase the agent's permissions. However, it mitigates this by instructing the agent to useAskUserQuestionto obtain permission before using these specific flags.
Audit Metadata