openspec-to-beads
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads planning artifacts from the
openspec/changes/directory, includingproposal.md,tasks.md,design.md, andspec.md. These files are interpreted by the agent to perform "Critical Analysis" and "Smart Conversion," making them potential vectors for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in these files could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Multiple files in
openspec/changes/<change>/includingproposal.md,tasks.md,specs/*/spec.md, anddesign.mdas specified inSKILL.mdunder Context Gathering. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not prescribe the use of delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or provide the agent with a safety warning to ignore instructions contained within the external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands including
bd create,bd dep add, andopenspec showvia the agent's environment. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content read from these files before it is processed or interpolated into command templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves executing local CLI tools (
openspecandbd) to retrieve specification data and create task tracking issues. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses templates defined in
templates/issue-creation.mdto dynamically construct shell commands at runtime. Data extracted from the OpenSpec files (such as<task-description>) is interpolated into these commands before they are executed, which presents a surface for command injection if the source data is maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata