researching-codebases
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
gather-metadata.pyscript executesgit remote get-url originto populate therepositoryfield in research document metadata. If a user has configured their local git remote with an embedded authentication token or credential (e.g.,https://<token>@github.com/user/repo), these secrets will be saved in plain text within the research files located in.research/or the user's home directory~/.research/. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
gather-metadata.pyscript utilizessubprocess.runto call the localgitbinary for retrieving repository state (branch, commit, remote URL). While this executes shell commands, the script correctly uses argument lists and avoidsshell=True, which is a safe implementation pattern for invoking system tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it coordinates agents that ingest and reason over untrusted data from both the local codebase and the web.
- Ingestion points: Files retrieved from the local filesystem via
read,grep, andglobtools, as well as external web content fetched by theweb-searcheragent usingwebfetch. - Boundary markers: The agent prompts do not utilize explicit delimiters or unique markers to wrap external data, which may allow malicious content within a file or webpage to influence sub-agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agents have the capability to perform extensive filesystem searches and external network fetches.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing external content before it is provided to the LLM agents for synthesis.
Audit Metadata