calibre-distill-topic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources (Calibre books) and processes that data to generate new instructions (SKILL.md).
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the local library via
calibre_get_content,calibre_search, andcalibre_semantic_search(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the ingested book content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the filesystem (creating new skill directories) and modify library metadata via
calibre_update_book. - Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions ('Own words only', 'Zero verbatim sentences') to prevent direct leakage of source content into the generated instructions, which acts as a manual/LLM-based filter.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
calibre-mcptoolset to perform operations on the local filesystem and library database, including searching, reading content, and optionally updating book metadata. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates new executable instruction files (
SKILL.md) and metadata (distill.manifest.yaml) based on processed input. While this is the intended purpose, it involves the runtime generation of agent capabilities.
Audit Metadata