calibre-distill-topic

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources (Calibre books) and processes that data to generate new instructions (SKILL.md).
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the local library via calibre_get_content, calibre_search, and calibre_semantic_search (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the ingested book content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the filesystem (creating new skill directories) and modify library metadata via calibre_update_book.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on natural language instructions ('Own words only', 'Zero verbatim sentences') to prevent direct leakage of source content into the generated instructions, which acts as a manual/LLM-based filter.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the calibre-mcp toolset to perform operations on the local filesystem and library database, including searching, reading content, and optionally updating book metadata.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates new executable instruction files (SKILL.md) and metadata (distill.manifest.yaml) based on processed input. While this is the intended purpose, it involves the runtime generation of agent capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 06:00 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — calibre-distill-topic