im-contact-sorter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external command-line tools for image manipulation and optimization.
- Specifically,
scripts/crop.pycallsmagickandscripts/compress.pycallspngquantusingsubprocess.runto process user-provided screenshots. - These subprocess calls use a list of arguments rather than a shell string, and do not enable shell execution (
shell=True), which prevents typical shell injection attacks from user-provided parameters such as image dimensions or directory names. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data extracted via OCR from user-provided screenshots, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from YAML files in the
03-ocrdirectory, which are created by the LLM based on its interpretation of contact list screenshots. - Boundary markers: The workflow relies on the structured YAML format to isolate data, but lacks explicit instructional delimiters to warn the agent against following instructions embedded in the data itself.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to local file system operations (read/write) and execution of specifically named local binaries (
magick,pngquant). - Sanitization: The scripts
scripts/analyze.pyandscripts/merge.pycorrectly useyaml.safe_load()for parsing external data. This is a robust security control that prevents the execution of malicious Python objects that might be embedded in the OCR output.
Audit Metadata