im-wiki-extractor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a procedural pattern in
templates/prompt_template.mdwhere it explicitly instructs the AI agent to write a shell script (.sh) to thedebug_logdirectory and subsequently execute that script to perform data operations. Generating and executing code at runtime is a high-risk pattern as it can be exploited if the generation logic is influenced by malicious input. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands to manage its workflow. It instructs the agent to use
sedto update task status intemplates/prompt_template.mdand uses thememoclibinary for database interactions. The scriptscripts/generate_prompt.pyalso spawns subprocesses to capture help text from thememoclitool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted chat logs which are interpolated directly into the sub-agent's prompt in
templates/prompt_template.mdusing the{{current_content}}placeholder. - Ingestion points: Reads markdown chat logs from the user-provided
source_dirviascripts/generate_prompt.py. - Boundary markers: Uses XML-style tags like
<当前的讨论>to delimit content, but lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore commands within those tags. - Capability inventory: File system write access (creating
.shscripts), shell execution (running the generated scripts andsed), and repository management viamemocli. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or sanitizing the chat content before it is placed into the prompt template.
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