interview-processor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted content including candidate resumes, job descriptions, and interview transcripts to generate automated reports.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested into the agent context in
task-1-pre-interview.md(JD and Resumes),task-2-post-interview-summary.md(Transcripts and Notes), andtask-3-post-interview-questions.md(Transcripts). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates utilize standard Markdown headers (e.g.,
### 输入上下文) to separate inputs, but they lack robust delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to disregard commands embedded within the data. - Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
memoclitool, including piping content derived from LLM output (e.g.,echo "[content]" | memocli create-entity). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested data before it is interpolated into prompts or used in shell command strings.
- Risk: Malicious text within a transcript or resume could be used to manipulate the agent's evaluation results or attempt to escape the
echocommand structure through the use of shell-sensitive characters like backticks or dollar signs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill declares a dependency on
github/cafe3310/agent-skill-memories-offin its frontmatter. This is a vendor-owned resource from the same author used for local entity management.
Audit Metadata