long-audio-transcript-processor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted text from audio transcripts, which creates a risk of indirect instructions influencing the agent. \n
- Ingestion points: The agent reads transcript files from
1-原始文件/and background documentation from2-要求和信息/as described inSKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or directives to isolate ingested text from the agent's instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
read_file,write_file, shell execution viased, and a Python script for its operations. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the transcripts before processing. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands and a Python script with parameters that may be derived from user input. \n
- The use of
sedin the workflow (sed -n '开始行,结束行p' ...) involves direct interpolation of parameters into a shell string, which could be exploited for command injection if inputs are maliciously crafted. \n - The
setup_workspace.pyscript accepts arbitrary file paths as arguments; if the agent is manipulated into passing sensitive system paths, the script will copy those files into the local workspace, potentially leading to unintended local data exposure.
Audit Metadata