long-audio-transcript-processor

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted text from audio transcripts, which creates a risk of indirect instructions influencing the agent. \n
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads transcript files from 1-原始文件/ and background documentation from 2-要求和信息/ as described in SKILL.md. \n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or directives to isolate ingested text from the agent's instructions. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses read_file, write_file, shell execution via sed, and a Python script for its operations. \n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the transcripts before processing. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands and a Python script with parameters that may be derived from user input. \n
  • The use of sed in the workflow (sed -n '开始行,结束行p' ...) involves direct interpolation of parameters into a shell string, which could be exploited for command injection if inputs are maliciously crafted. \n
  • The setup_workspace.py script accepts arbitrary file paths as arguments; if the agent is manipulated into passing sensitive system paths, the script will copy those files into the local workspace, potentially leading to unintended local data exposure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 02:51 PM