subject-learning-assistant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content (textbooks, papers, web content) and ingests it into a long-term memory graph using the
memoclitool. - Ingestion points: External data is ingested during 'Sub-process 1' in
SKILL.mdand read by the visualization server from a user-specified directory. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the ingestion flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell commands via
memocliand executes a local Python server for visualization. - Sanitization: While the Python server (
server.py) usesyaml.safe_load()for file parsing, the visualization frontend (index.html) uses D3.js's.html()method to render entity observations directly. This lack of output sanitization creates a potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) surface if the agent extracts and stores malicious script or HTML tags from source materials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing
memoclicommands via shell to manage the hierarchical knowledge graph. It also requires the user to manually execute a Python script (server.py) to provide the interactive dashboard. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The visualization dashboard (
index.html) fetches the D3.js library fromd3js.org. This is a well-known and trusted source for data visualization software and does not escalate the security verdict.
Audit Metadata