connector-slack

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the slack-client and caffeineai-authorization packages from the Motoko Package Manager registry (mops.one). While an automated scanner flagged the registry URL as suspicious, it is the standard, well-known package registry for the Motoko ecosystem.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides the capability to read content from Slack (e.g., channel history and replies), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: API calls to conversationsHistory and conversationsReplies as documented in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or developer instructions provided to distinguish between Slack message data and potential instructions to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent extensive capabilities, including posting/editing messages, deleting files, and managing reactions.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external Slack content is demonstrated in the provided Motoko snippets, meaning malicious content in a Slack message could be interpreted as instructions by the agent.
Recommendations
  • CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
  • Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 08:58 PM