extension-email
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted data by interpolating it into email bodies, which presents a surface for potential misuse if the agent processes malicious external content.
- Ingestion points: The
usernameandorderReferenceparameters in thesendOrderConfirmationEmailfunction example withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation example does not demonstrate the use of delimiters or warnings to isolate untrusted data within the email body.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network outcalls via
EmailClient.sendServiceEmailto an external gateway, as shown inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The documentation and code examples do not include explicit sanitization or escaping of the interpolated string components.
- [SAFE]: The skill follows secure practices by using platform-injected secrets (
INTEGRATIONS_GATEWAY_API_KEY) rather than hardcoding credentials, and it relies on versioned dependencies from the official vendor namespace.
Audit Metadata