extension-posting-to-x
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONSAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches the
x-clientpackage from themops.oneregistry. Automated security scans have flagged the URLhttps://mops.one/x-clientas potentially malicious (Phishing). While this domain is the standard registry for the Motoko ecosystem, users should exercise caution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to download and install external code using the command
mops add x-client@0.5.1. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text for tweets which is then sent to an external API sink.
- Ingestion points: The
bodyparameter in thetweetfunction located insrc/backend/mixins/x-posting.mo. - Boundary markers: Absent. The raw text is used directly in the API request.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network outcalls to the X API via
TweetsApi.createPostsinsrc/backend/lib/x.mo. - Sanitization: Absent. The input text is not sanitized before being sent to the X API.
- [SAFE]: The skill demonstrates strong security practices for handling sensitive credentials. It utilizes per-user OAuth tokens stored in private canister memory, strictly forbids the use of getters or logs for tokens, and mandates non-replicated HTTP outcalls (
is_replicated = ?false) to prevent token exposure and ensure execution determinism.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata