writing-motoko
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions utilize the
mopspackage manager, which installs software components from remote sources such as GitHub and package registries. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands using the
mopstoolchain for dependency management and project building (mops add,mops install,mops build). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dependency installation and compilation processes involve downloading and executing third-party code, which carries inherent risks of running untrusted logic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Automated scanning flagged the documentation site
https://docs.mops.one/as a phishing threat; the skill directs the agent to consult this site for troubleshooting, which could expose the agent to malicious content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection via its processing of untrusted code.
- Ingestion points: Reads Motoko source files (
.mo),mops.toml, andmops.lockfiles from the local environment. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack markers or specific instructions to distinguish code logic from potential embedded natural language instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses tools with file system modification (
mops check --fix), network access (mops add), and code compilation (mops build) capabilities. - Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization, validation, or filtering mechanisms for the content of the input files.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata