writing-motoko

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions utilize the mops package manager, which installs software components from remote sources such as GitHub and package registries.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands using the mops toolchain for dependency management and project building (mops add, mops install, mops build).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dependency installation and compilation processes involve downloading and executing third-party code, which carries inherent risks of running untrusted logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Automated scanning flagged the documentation site https://docs.mops.one/ as a phishing threat; the skill directs the agent to consult this site for troubleshooting, which could expose the agent to malicious content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection via its processing of untrusted code.
  • Ingestion points: Reads Motoko source files (.mo), mops.toml, and mops.lock files from the local environment.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack markers or specific instructions to distinguish code logic from potential embedded natural language instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses tools with file system modification (mops check --fix), network access (mops add), and code compilation (mops build) capabilities.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization, validation, or filtering mechanisms for the content of the input files.
Recommendations
  • Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Aug 9, 2026, 03:12 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — writing-motoko