skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The executor subagent (defined in
agents/executor.md) utilizes shell commands such aswc,find, andtrto calculate character counts of transcripts and output files as a proxy for token usage metrics. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
agents/executor.mdinstructions include a Python heredoc pattern (python3 << EOF) used to programmatically updatemetrics.jsonwith execution results. This is a localized technique for data management within the skill's workspace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data (eval prompts and test files) from the
evals/directory to test other skills. - Ingestion points: Evaluation prompts and input files are loaded from
evals/evals.jsonand theevals/files/directory. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or specific 'ignore instructions' warnings are defined in the subagent prompts to separate eval data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subagents have access to standard file operations and shell execution tools (Read, Write, Bash) to perform their tasks.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested eval content before it is processed by the subagents.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
scripts/init_skill.pyscript useschmod(0o755)to ensure that newly created helper scripts are executable. This is a standard and benign file permission adjustment for the skill's initialization process.
Audit Metadata