cali-agents-md-generator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to install an external CLI tool (
sem-cli) via Homebrew or by direct binary download from an unverified GitHub repository (Ataraxy-Labs/sem) as seen in the CI workflow configuration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs broad file system operations, including copying a shell script (
pre-commit-hook.sh) into the.git/hooks/directory and usingchmod +xto make it executable. This script is then configured to run automatically during every git commit process, establishing a persistence mechanism on the user's local environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The provided GitHub Action workflow (
github-action-guard.yml) implements a pattern that downloads a binary from a remote URL, extracts it to a system path (/usr/local/bin), and sets executable permissions. This constitutes execution of unverifiable code from an external source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted codebase files to generate instructions for AI agents.
- Ingestion points: Files such as
package.json,go.mod, andrequirements.txtare read and their contents are used to fill placeholders in theAGENTS.mdtemplate. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded directives when interpolating external content into the generated documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file-write capabilities and the ability to execute subprocesses, which could be exploited if malicious content is injected via the codebase files.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data extracted from the project files before it is incorporated into the agent's operating instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata