cali-coding-starhtml
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides instructions to download a Python script (starhtml_check.py) from an external GitHub repository (github.com/renatocaliari) usingcurl. It also suggests fetching demo files fromgithub.com/banditburai. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs users to download a remote script, place it in a system executable directory (
/usr/local/bin/), and grant it execution permissions (chmod +x), facilitating the execution of remote code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve executing system commands to install and update the
starhtml-checkutility, including commands that fetch and run code from the internet. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
js()function documented inreference/js.mdallows for the execution of raw JavaScript expressions. While the documentation provides a security warning, this capability allows for dynamic code execution at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a markdown rendering plugin (
data_markdown) and direct JavaScript integration, creating an attack surface where untrusted data could influence application behavior. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data can enter through the
todo_textparameter in SSE handlers or thedata_markdownattribute. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided documentation examples.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
starhtml-check(if run), raw JavaScript execution viajs(), and network operations viaget()andpost()actions. - Sanitization: The documentation includes a warning regarding JavaScript injection but does not provide mandatory sanitization patterns for the markdown plugin.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata