stelow-product-shape-up
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the installation of the 'cymbal' tool using a high-risk pattern that pipes a remote PowerShell script directly into an execution engine (
iex). - Evidence:
references/cli-tools/cymbal.mdcontains the commandirm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/1broseidon/cymbal/main/install.ps1 | iex. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill frequently attempts to download and execute code or plugins from unverified third-party repositories and registries that are not associated with the author or trusted vendors.
- Evidence:
references/cli-tools/codequality-review.mdreferencespi install git:github.com/cursor/pluginsandnpx skills add cursor/plugins -g. - Evidence:
references/cli-tools/safe-change.mdreferencespi install git:github.com/PriNova/pi-agent-codebase-workflows. - Evidence:
references/cli-tools/agent_browser.mdreferencesnpx -y @earendil-works/pi-agent-browser. - Evidence:
references/cli-tools/subagents.mdreferences@tintinweb/pi-subagentsandpi-subagentsfromnicobailon. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subagenttools andbashto execute complex logic, including dynamic script generation vianode -eto process project configurations. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains logic to runcymbal structure --jsonand pipe outputs to files which are later read to influence the shaping process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from project files and technical previews to drive the product shaping logic without adequate boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
stelow.json(workflow configuration),context/tech-preview.md(codebase analysis),context/blocking-constraints.md(previous cycle outputs), andcontext/existing-features.md(symbol search results). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill reads these files directly into the context to inform shaping decisions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including
subagentdelegation,bashcommand execution, and file writing/modification. - Sanitization: Partial. While it uses
nodeto parse JSON configurations, other inputs like technical risks and existing feature summaries are consumed as raw text. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While not directly exfiltrating credentials, the
agent-browsertool is instructed to open local and remote URLs to capture snapshots and interactions, which could be leveraged to capture sensitive UI states if misconfigured. - Evidence:
references/cli-tools/agent_browser.mddocuments theopen --url "{URL}" -- snapshot -icommand.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata