writing-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the
memory_searchtool and user responses collected viaask_user_questionas described in §0 and §7.2. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit syntax delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) for the injected data, though §17 provides strong instructional constraints ('Hard Floors') to prevent the agent from obeying fabricated instructions or facts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify the agent's long-term state via
memory_saveand interact with the user viaask_user_questionbased on processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from memory before it is interpolated into the drafting process.
Audit Metadata