cali-product-execution-critique
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The main skill logic in
SKILL.mdusesnode -eto execute inline JavaScript for modifying thestelow.jsonfile andpython3 -cto process JSON data from thesemtool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the installation of various extensions from third-party GitHub users, including
PriNova/pi-agent-codebase-workflows,nicobailon/pi-intercom, andtintinweb/pi-supervisor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
codequality-review.mdfile provides commands to download and execute code from a GitHub repository usingpi install git:github.com/cursor/plugins. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs environment discovery by probing the user's home directory for hidden configuration folders such as
~/.pi/,~/.opencode/,~/.claude/, and~/.codex/to detect the running agent harness. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external technical plans (
spec-tech*.md), product specifications (spec-product*.md), and live website content via theagent_browsertool. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or file-reading logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including shell access (
bash), file system writes (write), and dynamic script execution (node,python). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety delimiters for data ingested from the implementation files or browser snapshots before they are processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata