stelow-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from
state.mdand a 'Hand-off' block generated by previous, potentially untrusted agent turns. Thenext-candidatevalue is extracted and used to control subsequent system-level actions. - Ingestion points:
state.md(viaSTELOW_STATEmarker) and the previous skill's## Hand-offblock. - Boundary markers: None present to distinguish instructions from data within the hand-off blocks.
- Capability inventory: Executes
scripts/stelow advance,awk,grep, andjqvia shell. - Sanitization: The skill performs a validation check against
transitions.mdbut lacks proper shell-escaping for variables used in command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands and local scripts to perform state transitions.
- Evidence: Calls
scripts/stelow status,scripts/stelow advance,jq,awk, andgrepwithin the bash algorithm. - Context:
scripts/stelowis a vendor-provided tool (calionauta) used for workflow orchestration. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The algorithm dynamically constructs shell commands using variables
$nextand$currentwhich are populated from file contents. - Evidence:
scripts/stelow advance "$next"andcat >> "$STELOW_STATE"use shell interpolation that could be exploited if the input data contains shell metacharacters that bypass thegrepvalidation.
Audit Metadata