stelow-workflow-interface-alternatives

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project specification files to drive the generation of design proposals and tool execution.
  • Ingestion points: Processes spec-product.md and tech-recon.md within the .stelow directory to determine appetite and technical constraints.
  • Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the input specification files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (ls, grep, awk, source) and invokes external subagents and visual review tools.
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the input file content is performed before it is used to influence the workflow logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands and local script sourcing to manage its workflow and process data.
  • Shell utilities: Uses ls, grep, and awk to query file system state and extract text from generated artifacts.
  • Script sourcing: Employs the source command to load utility functions from a relative path (../../stelow-workflow-orchestrator/), establishing a dependency on an external script file from the same ecosystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 09:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stelow-workflow-interface-alternatives