stelow-workflow-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install several third-party packages and scripts from sources that are not recognized as trusted or well-known vendors. These include:
npx -y @earendil-works/pi-agent-browserinreferences/cli-tools/agent_browser.md.npx skills add Prinova/pi-agent-codebase-workflowsandpi install git:github.com/PriNova/pi-agent-codebase-workflowsinreferences/cli-tools/safe-change.md.pi install npm:@tintinweb/pi-tasksandpi install npm:@juicesharp/rpiv-todoinreferences/cli-tools/todo.md.pi-intercomby usernicobailoninreferences/cli-tools/intercom.md.@tintinweb/pi-subagentsandpi-subagentsby usernicobailoninreferences/cli-tools/subagents.md.pi-supervisorby usertintinwebinreferences/cli-tools/supervise.md.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes remote code by invoking the previously mentioned untrusted packages via
npx,pi install, or directly through bash commands after installation. This provides a direct path for executing arbitrary code from third-party repositories. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
node -eto dynamically parse and manipulate JSON configuration data (stelow.json) within shell scripts. This is found inSKILL.md,references/cli-tools/read-config.sh, andstages/setup.md. While used for configuration parsing, the use of dynamic string execution for logic is a notable behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Raw user input is parsed and grouped in the
triagestage (stages/triage.md) and then propagated through the workflow. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within this untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities across its stages, including file editing (
edit), file writing (write), shell execution (bash), and automated browsing (agent_browser). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of user-supplied data is performed before it is passed to subagents or used to influence workflow logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata